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Equilibrium coupon bond pricing relationships given differential taxation are derived under 
uncertainty assuming that both corporate and municipal bonds were originally issued at par but 
are currently selling at a discount. The impact of differential taxation upon the term structure 
and coupon structure of interest rates is investigated, while the tax structure of interest rates is 
uniquely characterized. Differential taxation substantially alters the prevailing equilibrium 
structure of interest rates. 
1. Introduction 
Apart from empirical investigations, relatively little effort has been ex- 
pended on systematically analyzing t a x  effects on the term structure of 
interest rates. Robichek and Niebuhr (1970) demonstrated that if quotations 
on discounted U.S. Treasury bonds are employed, tax induced bias can 
substantially alter the shape of the estimated yield curve. McCulloch (1975) 
originated an empirical procedure by which differential tax factors are 
explicitly taken into account in estimating the term structure and obtained a 
significantly improved fit to the available data. Subsequently, Schaefer (1981) 
developed a method of measuring the term structure which specifically 
accommodates the tax dependence of an investor's choice of securities. The 
empirical results established that the shape of the term structure may be 
markedly different for differing tax brackets. 
This paper systematically investigates these tax effects given a positive 
theory of coupon bond valuation within an uncertainty framework. As 
originally noted by Domar and Musgrave (1944), the imposition of taxation 
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within such a framework reduces not only the expected return to an 
investment but also its corresponding risk. We give formal cognizance to the 
uncertainty which pervades coupon bond markets, and evaluate the conse- 
quences of changes in taxation policy upon the equilibrium structure of 
interest rates. In particular, we consider the coupon structure - -  the response 
in yields to alternative coupon levels; the tax structure - -  the response in 
yields to alternative levels of taxation; and the term structure - -  the response 
in yields to alternative terms to maturity. 
Trading in coupon bond markets will be assumed to take place con- 
tinuously in time, and prevailing uncertainty summarized by state variables 
which follow diffusion processes. The economy is posited to have reached an 
underlying equilibrium in which the dynamics of these state variables have 
been determined. Coupon bonds are then priced relative to these processes 
so as to eliminate after-tax arbitrage opportunities. 
Tax effects within U.S. coupon bond markets arise for a number of 
reasons. Coupons on municipal debt, as opposed to corporate debt, are 
exempt from ordinary income taxation. If coupon bonds were originally 
issued at par but are currently selling at a discount, then realized appreci- 
ation is capital gains taxable. Tax authorities treat coupon bonds selling 
above par asymmetrically. In the case of a corporate bond, the amortizable 
bond premium is applied both as an adjustment to the basis of the bond, for 
determining gain or loss, and as a deduction in computing taxable income. 
On municipals the amortizable bond premium for the taxable year is an 
adjustment to the basis of the bond only. 
In section 2 we develop an equilibrium coupon bond pricing relationship 
given the differential taxation of realized capital gains versus coupon income 
and the differential taxation of corporate coupon income versus municipal 
coupon income. Investors are assumed to belong to a common tax bracket. 
In order to emphasize these differential tax effects, we investigate the 
equilibrium pricing of corporate and municipal bonds which were originally 
issued at par but are currently selling at a discount. 1 Presently, in U.S. 
coupon bond markets a majority of bonds sell at a discount from par. 
To examine the impact of differential taxation upon the equilibrium 
structure of interest rates, we subsequently posit a single state variable, the 
nominal spot rate of interest. We then establish in section 3 that increases 
(decreases) in the ordinary income tax rate result in increases (decreases) in 
corporate yields. Municipal yields are independent of the prevailing ordinary 
income tax rate. Alternatively, increases (decreases) in the capital gains tax 
1We do not consider original issue discount bonds. At their issue these bonds are priced at a 
discount from par. By contrast, we examine the equilibrium pricing of coupon bonds initially 
priced at par but subsequently selling at a discount because of currently higher prevailing 
interest rates. The taxation of these bonds differs from the taxation of original issue discount 
bonds. 
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rate give rise to increases (decreases) in both corporate and municipal yields. 
Additionally, yields are not independent of coupon level. The characteri- 
zation of this coupon effect is extended within an uncertainty framework. 
Differential taxation also biases the yield curve. We illustrate these biases 
in section 4 assuming nominal spot rate dynamics are now characterized by 
a trend-adjusted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Under this specification, the 
current nominal spot rate reverts stochastically to a long-term mean, the 
fluctuations of the process being independent of the level of the nominal spot 
rate. This nominal spot rate process is economically intuitive and, fur- 
thermore, there exists empirical evidence supporting its validity. Given 
estimated parameters of the trend-adjusted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, 
differential taxation exerts a downward bias on the short-term end of the 
corporate yield curve. Furthermore, differential taxation imparts a uniform 
downward bias across all terms to maturity of the municipal yield curve. 
However, if municipals are selling at a sufficiently deep discount this latter 
effect may be augmented by a tax induced upward bias at the municipal 
yield curve's short-term end. Section 5 summarizes our conclusions. 
2. Tax-adjusted equilibrium pricing of coupon bonds 
A coupon bond may be characterized as a portfolio of pure discount 
bonds. The principal payment of each pure discount bond corresponds to a 
contractually stipulated coupon payment. Given a continuous-time frame- 
work, the equilibrium price of a default-free coupon bond may then be 
expressed as a weighted integral of equilibrium default-free pure discount 
bond prices. 
We assume that there exists a set of n state variables Y={Y1,..., Y,} 
whose current values specify all relevant information for investors. The state 
variables are assumed to be jointly Markov, with dynamics of the ith state 
variable described by the stochastic differential equation 
dYi(t)=ai(Y,t)dt+a_i(Y_,t)dZ_(t ), i= l , . . . , n ,  (1) 
where _Z={Z1,Zz,...,Zk} is a k-dimensional standardized Wiener process 
with n>=k. 2 Here ai(Y_,t) represents the expected rate of change in the ith 
state variable, while o-i(_Y, t) is a k-dimensional vector of diffusion coefficients 
measuring the response of the ith state variable to each of the economy's 
sources of uncertainty. The current state of the economy, and therefore the 
prevailing structure of interest rates, is summarized by current values of these 
2A k-dimensional standardized Wiener process is a collection of k independent r andom 
variables, each with mean increment zero and unitary variance per unit time increment. We 
allow n >  k since a number  of the state variables may  be non-stochastic. For  example, a state 
variable m a y  be an average of other state variables. 
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state variables. The economy is assumed to have reached an underlying 
equilibrium in which all investors agree upon and take as given the current 
values of the state variables and their posited dynamics. 
Bond markets are competitive with each investor acting like a price taker 
and, apart from taxation, bond markets are assumed frictionless. Riskless 
instantaneous borrowing or lending takes place at the exogenously deter- 
mined equilibrium nominal spot rate of interest r. Bond markets are open 
continuously with trading allowed only at equilibrium prices. 
The following tax regime will be assumed throughout. Receipt of corporate 
coupon income is taxed at the ordinary income tax rate i (0<i<1) ,  
municipal coupon income being exempt. Realizable gains on coupon bonds 
are subject to capital gains taxation at the capital gains tax rate g ( 0 = g <  1) 
with 100~o offsets on losses. Instantaneous borrowing or lending at the 
nominal spot rate of interest is ordinary income taxable. Furthermore, the 
ordinary income tax rate exceeds the capital gains tax rate,, i>g, and all 
investors belong to a common tax bracket. 
The assumption of a common tax bracket is empirically implausible. 
However, as argued by Schaefer (1982), problems arise if this assumption is 
relaxed. Specifically, in a bond market with differential taxation but which is 
otherwise frictionless, the existence of multiple tax brackets is inconsistent 
with bond market equilibrium. When there are investors in more than one 
tax bracket it is impossible to set prices such that arbitrage opportunities are 
eliminated for all investors. Our analysis is consistent with bond market 
equilibrium by assuming all inventors' tax rates are equalized. We cannot 
obtain exact results as to the equilibrium pricing formulations that will result 
in a market characterized by investors with different tax brackets. 
Within the continuous-time framework, coupons are assumed to be 
received continuously and ordinary income taxes k due on corporate coupon 
income are assumed paid continuously. Capital gains taxes are also assumed 
to be paid continuously on instantaneously realizable capital gains. We draw 
no distinction between short-term and long-term capital gains. This assump- 
tion, however, is at variance with the provision of most tax codes requiring 
that financial assets be held for a minimum period of time, usually one year, 
before the resultant gains or losses are subject to the lower long-term capital 
gains tax rate. Consequently, we ignore the value of the timing option on 
capital gains as noted by Constantinides (1983), and Constantinides and 
Ingersoll (1982). That is, given a distinction between short-term and long- 
term capital gains, bond prices should reflect an optimal trading policy on 
the part of investors which includes, among other things, the realization of 
short-term capital losses and the deferment of the realization of short-term 
capital gains. While the assumption that capital gains taxes are paid 
continuously is restrictive, as previously noted by Ananthanarayanan and 
Schwartz (1980) it is required within a continuous-time framework to ensure 
a unique equilibrium bond value. 
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We now characterize the equilibrium price of a coupon bond given the 
continuous-time framework and presumed tax regime. Consider a bond 
selling at a discount which pays a constant coupon C, 0 < C< 1, continuously 
between t (today) and m (maturity). B(_Y(t), t, m) denotes the current price of 
this default-free coupon bond and, without loss of generality, assume the 
price is normalized so that at maturity, 
B(Y_(m), m, m) = 1 for all m ~ (t, 0o). (2) 
Let P(_Y(t), t, o9) denote the current price of a default-flee pure discount 
bond promising an after-tax cash flow of one dollar at time co (t<co <m). 
Assuming the availability of these pure discount bonds, we may write 
711 
B(Y(t) , t ,m)=6* ~ P(Y_ (t),t, og)dog+6**P(Y(t),t,m). 
t 
(3) 
Evaluating expression (3) at t + h, where h > 0, gives 
B(Y_ (t + h), t + h, m) = 6* 
m 
P( Y(t + h), t + h, og) do9 
t+h 
+ b**P(Y(t + h), t + h, m), and 
[B(_Y(t + h), t + h , m ) -  B(Y(t), t,m)]/h 
m 
=6* ~ (I-P(_Y(t +h),t +h, og)-P(Y_ (t),t, og)]/h)dco 
It 




(P( Y_ (t + h), t + h, co)/h) do9 
+ 6**([P(_Y(t + h), t + h, m ) -  P(Y_(t), t, m)]/h). 
As h ~ 0  + we have, 3 
m 
dB(Y_ (t) , t ,m)=6* ~ dP(Y_ (t),t, og)&o+6** dP(Y_ ( t) , t ,m)-6* dt. 
t 
(4) 
From expression (4), the appreciation of a default-flee coupon bond is 
dependent upon the appreciation of default-free pure discount bonds. If the 
appreciation of a default-free coupon bond is capital gains taxable, we 
3Cauchy's Dominated Convergence Theorem allows us to take the differentiation operator 
through the integral operator. 
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require that the appreciation of default-free pure discount bonds also be 
capital gains taxable. Intuitively, we may view a pure discount bond as a 
special case of a coupon bond with zero coupon payments and therefore 
subject to the same taxation provisions. 
Multiplying expression (4) by ( 1 -  g) and rearranging gives 
(1-g)dB(Y(t),t,m)+(1-g)~* dt 
n l  
=6* ~ (1-g)dP(Y(t),t, og)dco+6**(1-g)dP(Y(t),t,m), 
t . 
(5) 
the right-hand side of expression (5) representing the instantaneous after-tax 
return to  the portfolio of pure discount bonds. 
In equilibrium, the instantaneous after-tax return to the coupon bond must 
equal the instantaneous after-tax return to the posited portfolio of pure 
discount bonds. However, the instantaneous after-tax return to a fully 
taxable corporate bond is given by 
(1-g)dB(Y(t),t,m)+(1-i)Cdt for all me(t, ~), 
and from expression (5) we have, 
( 1 - g) dB(Y(t), t, m) + ( 1 - i)C dt 
=(1-g)dB(Y(t),t,m)+(1-g)f* dt for all me(t, oo), 
o r  
6*= TC where T = ( 1 - i ) / ( 1 - g )  for all me(t, oo). 
Applying the terminal condition, expression (2), to expression (3) gives 4 
6** = 1 for all m e (t, oo). 
4An alternative derivation of the equilibrium value of 6** which makes clear its independence 
with respect to the coupon bond's term to maturity is also possible. The equilibrium value of a 
coupon bond is 
m 
B(Y(t), t, m) = 6" S P(_Y(t), t, a}) dr9 + 6**e(Y(t), t, m). 
t 
This characterization holds for all maturity dates m e(t, ~ )  and coupon payments. In particular, 
restricting our attention to the case C=0,  in the case of a corporate bond we have 6*= T. 0=0,  
while in the case of a municipal bond we have 6 " = ( 1 - g ) - 1 - 0 = 0 ,  giving B(Y_(t),t,m)= 
6**P(Y_(t),t,m) for all me( t ,~) .  However, a coupon bond for which C = 0  is but a pure 
discount bond, and equilibrium in this case requires B(Y(t), t,m)=P(_Y(t), t, m) for all m e(t, ~). 
Hence, 6**= 1 for all me(t, ~). 
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An analogous argument establishes in the case of a tax-exempt municipal 
bond 
( 1 - g )  dB(_Y(t), t,m) + C dt =(1 -g )  dB(Y(t), t,m) 
+ ( 1 - g ) f * d t  for all me( t ,~ ) ,  
o r  
6* = ( 1 - g ) - X C  for all me(t, oo). 
We may now characterize equilibrium coupon bond prices assuming 
investors belong to a common tax bracket and given the assumed tax regime. 
The equilibrium price of a default-free corporate bond may be expressed as 
Bcp(Y_ ( t ) , t ,m)=CT ~ P(Y_ (t),t, og)dog+ P(Y_ (t),t,m), 
t 
(6) 
while the equilibrium price of a default-free municipal bond becomes 
m 
BMu(_Y(t), t, m) = C(1 - g)- 1 ~ p(y(t), t, 09) do) + P(Y(t), t, m). 
t 
(7) 
Here P(_Y(t), t, og) is the equilibrium price of a pure discount bond maturing 
at time 09 (t<og<m), its instantaneous appreciation assumed capital gains 
taxable. 
3. The tax structure and coupon structure of interest rates 
Following Merton (1973), Brennan and Schwartz (1977), Vasicek (1977), 
Dothan (1978), and Ananthanarayanan and Schwartz (1980), we assume a 
single state variable, the nominal spot rate of interest, r, characterizes 
equilibrium bond prices, s By simplifying the underlying economic framework, 
we concentrate on examining the effects of taxation upon the resultant 
equilibrium structure of interest rates. In particular, this section subsequently 
examines the impact of differential taxation upon equilibrium corporate and 
municipal yields (the tax structure of interest rates), as well as the relation- 
ship between coupon level and equilibrium yields (the coupon structure of 
interest rates). 
The state variable r evolves as a non-standardized Wiener process 
dr = a, (r, t) dt + tr, (r, t) dZ, 
5We cannot in general derive comparative static results for the more general case where n 
state variables _Y characterize equilibrium bond prices. This analysis requires that specific 
assumptions regarding the taxation of these state variables be made. 
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where ar and o-, denote the instantaneous drift and standard deviation, 
respectively, of the nominal spot rate process. The equilibrium price of a 
default-free corporate bond may then be written as 
m 
Bcp(r( t ) , t ,m)=CT ~ e(r(t),t, og)dog+ e(r(t),t,m), 
t 
while the equilibrium price of a default-free municipal bond becomes 
?n 
BMu(r( t), t, m) = C ( 1 -  g) -1 1 P(r( t), t, og) dog + P(r( t), t, m). 
t 
To complete the specification requires the equilibrium price of a capital gains 
taxable pure discount bond P(r(t), t, o9) (t<og<m). Given the posited nominal 
spot rate dynamics, P(r(t), t, og) is the unique solution to the second order 
partial differential equation, 6 
1 O2p 2+( a, 2a,)OP_TrP+Op=O,~r -7- 
2 ~r 2 a, - at 
subject to the boundary condition, 
P(r(og), o9, o9) = 1. 
Here the exogenous parameter 2 denotes the market price of risk, and gives 
the additional expected pure discount bond rate of return commensurate with 
bearing an additional unit of risk as measured by the instantaneous stan- 
dard deviation of the pure discount bond's rate of return. As before, T = (1 - / ) /  
(1 -g). The unique and general solution to this second order partial differential 
equation is given by 
{ i ° } P(r(t),t, og)=Et exp-  [Tr(s)+ l/222(r(s),s)] ds + [. 2(r(s),s)dZ(s) , t 
where Et is the expectation operator conditional upon the state variable at 
time t. 7 Therefore, within our partial equilibrium framework, exogenously 
6Assume, without loss of generality, the existence of two capital gains taxable pure discount 
bonds of distinct maturities. The price of each is posited to be a C 2 function of the prevailing 
ordinary income taxable nominal spot rate, r(t), and time, t. We may form a riskless hedge in 
these two pure discount bonds, and the absence of arbitrage opportunities on an after-tax basis 
requires that the given second order partial differential equation be satisfied. Equilibrium further 
implies that the market price of risk, 2, defined here as the ratio of a pure discount bond's 
expected excess return to the corresponding instantaneous standard deviation, is independent of 
term to maturity. 
7See Friedman (1964, especially p. 64). 
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characterizing both nominal spot rate dynamics and the market price of risk 
uniquely characterizes the equilibrium price of a pure discount bond and, in 
turn, the equilibrium prices of default-free corporate and municipal bonds. 
Given equilibrium bond prices, equilibrium yields follow. Assuming a 
default-free corporate bond with term to maturity z = m - t  and which 
continuously pays a constant coupon C, the corresponding yield-to-maturity 
YcP is uniquely determined by the implicit function 
Bcp(r(t), t, m) - Cyc¢ - (1 - C y J )  exp ( - YcP z) = 0. (8) 
Alternatively, assuming a default-free municipal bond, the corresponding 
yield-to-maturity Yuu is uniquely determined by the implicit function 
BMu(r(t), t ,m) - -Cy~ l - - (1 - -Cy~)exp( -  yuuz)=O. (9) 
Equilibrium yields systematically vary in response to changes in prevailing 
tax rates. To investigate the change in corporate yields brought about by 
changes in the ordinary income tax rate, we totally differentiate (8) with 
respect to YcP and i, 
t~ycp dBcp/Oi 
Oi (C/y2p)(exp(-ycp'C) - 1)-z(1-C/ycp)exp(-YcvZ)" 
The change in municipal yields due to changes in the ordinary income tax 
rate is illustrated by totally differentiating (9) with respect to YMu and i, 
aYMU ~BMu/Oi 
, 
$i (C/Y~u)(exp(-- yMv'C)-- 1)--z(1--C/Y~u)exp(--YMuZ) 
The denominators of the preceding expressions are unambiguously negative 
since the coupon bonds are assumed selling at a discount. 8 It follows that 
sgnt-- -j=-sgnL-- l and sgn =-sgnt--T?- j. 
Ceteris paribus, within our economic framework the nominal spot rate of 
interest will increase (decrease) in response to an increase (decrease) in the 
prevailing ordinary income tax rate. Recall that instantaneous borrowing or 
SFor example, consider the denominator  of dycp/Oi. Since Yce > 0 it follows that exp ( - y c p X ) -  
1 < 0 for ~ = m - t  > 0, and as such (C/y 2 )  (exp(-YceZ) - 1 ) <  0. Since the coupon bond is assumed 
selling at a discount from par, then C < Ycv or 1 -  C/ycp> 0 giving z ( 1 -  C/ycp) e x p ( - y c e z ) > 0 .  
Taking these results together, we have (C/y 2)  (exp ( - YceZ) - 1) - T(1 - C/ycp)ex p ( - Yce ~) < O. 
A completely analogous argument establishes that the denominator of ~YMu/Oi is also un- 
ambiguously negative. 
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lending at the nominal spot rate of interest is ordinary income taxable and, 
furthermore, all investors belong to a common tax bracket. In the absence of 
ordinary income taxation (i = 0), equilibrium in the market for instantaneous 
risk-free loans is characterized by 
Lo(r,)=Ls(r,). 
Here L D denotes the demand for instantaneous risk-free loans, Ls denotes the 
supply of instantaneous risk-free loans, while r ,  is the nominal spot rate of 
interest which in the absence of ordinary income taxation equilibrates 
demand with supply. With the imposition of ordinary income taxation (i > 0), 
equilibrium in this market is now characterized by 
LD((1 --i)r)= Ls((1 -i)r) ,  
where r is the pre-tax nominal spot rate of interest which 
demand with supply. It follows then that, ceteris paribus, 
(1 - i ) r=r ,  or r = ( i _ i ) r  ,. 
equilibrates 
The prevailing nominal spot rate of interest is grossed up by one minus the 
prevailing ordinary income tax rate. The equilibrium quantity of risk-free 
loans is unaltered by the imposition of ordinary income taxation since the 
equilibrium after-tax nominal spot rate of interest is unaltered. Furthermore, 
the government collects zero tax revenue as a result of a change in the 
prevailing ordinary income tax rate since all lenders and borrowers belong to 
a common tax bracket. Ceteris paribus, investors' preferences, endowments, 
and available production opportunities are unaltered by this particular fiscal 
policy. Under these assumptions, we may establish that OBcp/gi<O and 
~BMu/~i =0. 9 It follows that 
9 Bce(r(t), t, m) = C T S~ P(r(t), t, co) do9 + P(r(t), t, m), and Buo(r(t), t, m) = C(1 - g) - iS? P(r(t), t, o9) dm+ 
P(r(t), t, m), where under  our  assumptions,  {o o } 
P(r(t), t, co) = Et exp - I [Tr(s) + 1/222(r(s), s)] ds + 1 2(r(s), s) dZ(s) , 
t ! 
= E t e x p  - 1-g) - l r , ( s )+ l /222(r , ( s ) , s ) ]ds+ 2(r,(s),s)dZ(s , 
t 
and it follows that OP(Nt), t, co)/Oi=O. Then, 
m ~ OP(~o) OP(m) 
OBcp(m) _ C(1 - g )  -1 ~ P(to) do) + CT ~ ~ do) + O--~z 
t3i t 
= - C ( 1 - g )  -1 ~ P(og)dog<0, while 
t 
OBMu(m) ~, ~P(to) OP(m) 
~ = C ( l - g ) - I  ], ---fff--z + oi =0. 
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OYcr > 0 and --OYMu = O. 
Oi Oi 
Since corporate coupon income is ordinary income taxable, equilibrium 
corporate yields are grossed up to offset increased ordinary income taxation. 
However, municipal coupon income is tax-exempt. 
The change in corporate yields resulting from changes in the capital gains 
tax rate is given by 
t~ycp O B c p / @  
Bg (C/y2e)(exp(-ycv'C) - 1)- 'c(1-C/Yce)exp(-ycpz) '  
whereas the change in municipal yields due to changes in the capital gains 
tax rate may be shown to be 
OYMU OBMu/Og 
Og (C/yZu)(exp(--YMuZ) - 1)--Z(1--C/YMu)eXp(--YMUZ) 
Now, l° 
[OYcv]= [OBcp] 
sgn[_ c3g ] -sgn[_ t3g _] and s g n  = -sgnt-cj, 
and we may establish that OBcp/Og < 0 and OBMu/Og < 0.11 Therefore, 
C3Ycr > 0 and 63YMU 
Og Og 
- - > 0 .  
1°Here we note that the denominators of OYcv/~g and 3YMu/~g, are also unambiguously 
negative. This follows from footnote 8, and noting that the denominator of OYcP/@ corresponds 
to the denominator of Oycp/ai, while the denominator  of aYMtJ/~g corresponds to the denomi- 
nator of t3YMu/Oi. 
11Initially consider OBcp(m)/Og = CT(1 --g)-  tST' P(og) do9 + C T  S'F( ~P(~o)/ag)do9 + dP(m)/@, where 
we have temporarily suppressed functional dependence. We can express the equilibrium pure 
discount bond price as P(og)=EtY(og)exp(-TX(co)),  where X(og)=~fr(s)ds, while Y(og)= 
exp(-1/2j'~'22(r(s), s)ds + I~'2(r(s), s)dZ(s)). Since X(og)> 0, according to Taylor's theorem we have 
(l/h){ Y(w) exp( - ( T +  h)X(o~) - Y(o~) exp ( - TX(w))} 
= - X(og) Y(og) exp ( - TX(m)) + (hX2(o9)/2) exp ( - (T + Oh)X(eg), 
where 0 is random and 0 <  0 < 1. For  X(oJ)> 0, the function (X2(~o)/2)exp(-TX(oJ)) is bounded 
between zero and some constant Br.  Therefore, for h > 0 
-- Et X(og) Y(og) exp ( - TX(~o)) < (l/h) {E, Y(og) exp ( -- (T + h)X(co)) - E, Y(o) exp ( -- TX(co))} 
=< - Et X(og) Y(og) exp ( - TX(co)) + hB r. 
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Both equilibrium corporate yields and equilibrium municipal yields increase 
(decrease) with an increasing (decreasing) capital gains tax rate. Intuitively, 
since both corporate and municipal issues are selling at a discount, an 
increase in the prevailing capital gains tax rate results in increased taxation 
of realizable appreciation. Equilibrium yields are grossed up to offset this 
increased taxation. 
Equilibrium yields are also dependent upon the coupon level. The initial 
characterization of the coupon effect is due to Buse (1970): if the yield-to- 
maturity of a bond is greater (less) than an average of future nominal spot 
rates expected to prevail over the maturity of the bond, a positive (negative) 
coupon effect results. 12 Intuitively, the coupon effect arises because of a 
divergence between the holding period yield and yield-to-maturity. To 
generalize this result within our uncertainty framework with taxation, 
initially we totally differentiate (8) with respect to YcP and C: 
tgYcp [ T ~ '  P(r( t), t, co) dco - y c /  + Yc~ exp ( -  ycpZ)] 
and 
OC - (  C/yZe)(exp ( - YcP z) - 1) - ~( 1 - C/Ycr,) exp ( - Ycv "r)' 
s nE l o' o 1 
For  h<0 ,  the inequalities are reversed. Letting h---,0 we obtain dP(co)/gT=-EtX(co)Y(co)exp 
( - TX(co)). Then. 
m 
dBcp(m)/dg = (CT/(1 - g ) )  S E, Y(to) exp ( - TX(co)) dco 
t 
+(CT/(1-g)) ~ Er-TX(og)Y(¢o) 
t 
x exp( -- TX(~o)) d¢o- T/(1 -g)ErX(m)Y(m) exp( - TX(m)). 
Since {Y(og):aJ>0} is a martingale, we have 
(d/~m)(dBcr(m)/dg) = ( - T/(1 -g ) )  E,{(r(m) - C)(1 - TX(m))} Y(m) exp ( - TX(m). 
Notice that (i) ~2Bcp(m)/dmag~-T(1-g)-l(r(t)-C)<O as m~t, since the coupon bond is 
assumed currently selling at a discount from par; (ii) there exists a unique and finite m*, defined 
by 1-TX(m*)=O, for which ~2B~(m)/am~g=O. Remarks (i) and (ii), together with the 
observation that dBci,(m)/dg~O as m~t  and dBcp(m)/Sg--*O as m--,oo, is sufficient to establish 
that dBcp(m)/~g<O for all me(0,  oo). A completely analogous argument establishes that 
dBMv(m)/~g<O for all me(0,  oo). 
12A word of caution is appropriate at this point. Our discussion of the coupon effect 
concentrates solely on Buse's (1970) characterization. Subsequently, Khang (1975), Schaefer 
(1977), and Shiller and Modigliani (1979) derived a somewhat stronger specification of the 
coupon effect based on current rather than expected interest rates. No assumptions regarding 
uncertainty and reinvestment rates are required. Our analysis of the coupon effect does not 
pertain to their results. 
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or equivalently, 13 
375 
FOYcP = 
sgn[_ OC _] - sgn  [exp ( -  YcPZ) - P(r(t)' t' m)]" 
Upon simplification, the appropriate characterization of the coupon effect in 
the case of a fully taxable coupon bond is 
~YcP > 
~C ~0,  a s  
{7 " } - > - z - l l n E ,  exp - [Tr(s) + 1/222(r(s),s)] ds + ~ 2(r(s),s) dZ(s) . YCP t 
An analogous argument in the case of a tax-exempt coupon bond gives 
aYMu > 
~C ~0,  as 
Yuu -~ - z-  1 In Et exp ~ - 
( 
, [Tr(s)+ 1/222(r(s),s)] ds + ~, 2(r(s),s)dZ(s)}. 
Two details should be noted with regard to the coupon effect. First, the 
impact of coupon level upon equilibrium corporate yields differs from its 
impact upon equilibrium municipal yields. This result follows from the 
differential taxation of corporate and municipal issue which ensures that, 
ceteris paribus, YcP # YMu. Second, if the yield-to-maturity corresponds to the 
expected holding period yield then a negative coupon effect results. This 
result is due to uncertainty surrounding the realization of future nominal 
spot rates of interest. We verify this by temporarily ignoring differential 
taxation, setting i = 0  and g =  0 or equivalently T =  1, and ceteris paribus, Ycl,= 
yMv=y since no distinction now exists between corporate and municipal 
~SFrom (8), the  the  equ i l i b r ium c o r p o r a t e  yield,  YcP; is impl ic i t ly  def ined  by  
C T I~' P(r(t), t, eg) do9 + V(r(t), t, m) = Cyc~ + ( 1 - Cyc~) e xp  ( - Yce z). 
Rear rang ing ,  we have  
T I t  P(r(t), t, to) dto - Y c / +  Yc~ exp  ( - Ycv'c) = C -  l ( exp  ( - YcP z) - P(r(t) ,  t, m)). 
I t  fol lows that  
sgn [ T I?  P(I"(t), t, to) dto - y ~ l  + Yc~ exp  ( - YcP z)] = sgn [ exp  ( - Yo, z) - P(r(t) ,  t, m)]. 
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issues. The appropriate characterization of the coupon effect becomes 
cSy >--0 ~C < , as 
Y > - z - ~ l n  Et exp I - i  [r(s)+l /222(s 'r (s) )]ds+72(s 'r (s) )dZ(s)}  " t  
Assume that the current yield-to-maturity coincides with the current risk- 
adjusted average of nominal spot rates expected to prevail over the term to 
maturity of the bond, 
But by Jensen's Inequality [see Feller (1971, especially pp. 153-154)] we 
have, 
{i '} z -1 E, [r(s)+l/222(s,r(s))]ds - 2( s, r( s) ) dZ( s t 
< - z  -1 lnE, exp - [r(s)+ 1/222(s,r(s))] ds+~ 2( s, r( s) ) dZ( s) , 
t t 
and a negative coupon effect must result. Intuitively, although yield-to- 
maturity coincides with expected holding period yield, there exists un- 
certainty regarding the holding period yield. To diminish the effects of this 
uncertainty, the prices of bonds with larger coupons are bid up. These bonds 
have less return in the form of appreciation realized at maturity and greater 
return in the form of coupon disbursements over the entire term to maturity. 
Given uncertain reinvestment rates, larger coupon disbursements are to be 
preferred to a larger lump-sum payment at maturity. Indeed, if the current 
yield-to-maturity exceeds the current risk-adjusted average of expected 
nominal spot rates, a negative coupon effect may still obtain simply reflecting 
this preference for bonds with larger coupons. 1. The recent empirical analysis 
of Brennan and Schwartz (1982) consistently documented negative coupon 
effects, the predominance of which would be expected in a world of 
uncertainty. 
1*These coupon effect results are generalizable to the case where n state variables characterize 
equilibrium bond prices. Intuitively, our derivation of these results does not depend upon the 
equilibrium bond prices being a function of a single state variable. 
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To summarize, this section has examined the impact of alternative tax 
rates and alternative coupon levels upon equilibrium corporate and 
municipal yields. We assumed that equilibrium bond prices were character- 
ized by a single state variable, the nominal spot rate of interest, whose 
dynamics were described by a non-standardized Wiener process. To further 
investigate the tax structure and coupon structure of interest rates and, in 
particular, investigate tax-induced biases in the yield curve requires a more 
specialized characterization of the nominal spot rate process. 
4. Simulation results and the tax-adjusted yield curve 
We now specialize our analysis by assuming nominal spot rate dynamics 
follow a trend-adjusted version of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, 
dr(t) = k(l~-r(t))  dt  + a, dZ(t), 
with k > 0  and a , > 0  constants. The instantaneous drift, k ( # - r ( t ) ) ,  implies 
that the current nominal spot rate reverts elastically to a long-term mean, 
#>0 ,  with a speed of adjustment k>0.  The instantaneous variance, o -2, is 
such that the process fluctuates initially about the path of adjustment and 
subsequently about the long-term mean continuously and independent of 
both time and the level of the nominal spot rate. This specification is due to 
Merton (1971) and Vasicek (1977). The previous analysis of Dobson et al. 
(1971) supports the empirical validity of this nominal spot rate specification. 
However, an empirical inadequacy of this specification is that it implies a 
constant long-term rate of interest, a feature not recently evident in bond 
markets. 
A further property of the trend-adjusted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck specification 
is that with probability one negative nominal spot rates obtain transiently. 
We examine the relevance of this implication by considering 70, the 
corresponding mean time required to reach a non-positive interest rate level 
given an initial nominal spot rate of interest ro > 0 where 
and • is the standardized normal cumulative function./5 Langetieg (1980) 
argues that the trend-adjusted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is an adequate 
representation of nominal spot rate dynamics provided the current nominal 
spot rate is well above zero. Notice that aTo/Oro>0 and indeed the greater 
the current nominal spot rate, the greater the mean time required to reach a 
15This result follows from Cox and Miller (1972, p. 249). Here 70 must be evaluated 
numerically. 
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non-positive interest rate level. However, 7o depends critically on all the 
parameters of the trend-adjusted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. For example, 
assuming reasonable annualized parameter values of ro=0.095, #=0.056, 
k=0.074 and a ,=0.007,  the plausibility of these parameter values to be 
established below, then ? o - 1 3 2  quarters. We emphasize that there do exist 
reasonable characterizations of the trend-adjusted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck pro- 
cess for which ?o is sufficiently large, and hence the possibility of reaching a 
non-positive interest rate level over any finite term of policy interest is 
negligible. We then implicitly restrict our attention to these plausible 
characterizations throughout the subsequent analysis. 
To conclude our specification, we characterize the market price of risk. 
This premium is determined within the economy's underlying equilibrium 
and is dependent upon investors' preferences, endowments, and available 
production opportunities. From Vasicek (1977), we assume 
t )  = 
a constant independent of time and the prevailing level of the nominal spot 
rate. 
Following Vasicek (1977), the equilibrium price of a capital gains taxable 
pure discount bond may now be expressed as 16 
P(r(t), t, o))=exp [k -  l ( 1 - e x p ( - k ( o g - t ) ) ( r l  - Tr(t)) 
--(o9--t)tl--(a 2/4k3)(1 - exp ( -  k(co- t)))2], 
where 
rl= # - ( a , / k ) 2 - 1 / 2 ( a 2  /k2). 
By expression (6), the equilibrium price of a default-free fully taxable 
corporate bond may be explicitly written as 
Bcp(r (t), t, m) = Cr(t) -1 + [ 1 + CT((t 1 - Tr(t)) exp ( - kz) - t/ 
- (a~/k2)( l  - e x p  ( - kz)) exp ( - kz))- 1] 
x exp [k-1(1 - e x p ( - k z ) ) ( r l -  Tr ( t ) ) -  zr/ 
- ( a ,  2/4k3)(1 - e x p  ( - kz))]. (10) 
16Vasicek (1977) examined the equilibrium pricing of pure discount bonds in the absence of 
differential taxation. Vasicek's equilibrium pure discount bond price [see Vasicek (1977 
especially p. 185, eq. (27))-I differs from our solution in only that the role of r(t) is now replaced 
by Tr(t) where T=(1- i ) / (1 -g ) ,  reflecting the ordinary income taxation of the single state 
variable and the capital gains taxation of the pure discount bond. 
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Alternatively, by expression (7), the equilibrium price of a default-free tax- 
exempt municipal bond may be expressed as 
BMu(r ( t), t, m) = C(( 1 - i)r( t ) ) -  1 
+[1 + C(1 - g )  - l ((r /-  T r ( t ) ) e x p ( - k z ) - r  I 
- ( a ,  2/k2)(1 - e x p  ( - kz)) exp ( - kz)) - 1] 
x exp [k-  x(1 - exp ( -  k'c))(r/- T r ( t ) ) - r r l  
- ( a  2/4k3)(1 - exp ( - kz)) -1 ]. (11) 
Notice that as a,---r0 +, the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck nominal spot rate process 
becomes deterministic. Further, as k--.0 ÷, the speed of adjustment is such 
that the prevailing nominal spot rate never deviates from the long-term 
mean. Intuitively, given these restrictions investors possess a fiat and non- 
stochastic expectation of future nominal spot rates, 
r(t) = #, all t > 0. 
Applying these restrictions to expressions (10) and (11), the equilibrium price 
of a default-free fully taxable corporate bond becomes 
Bcp(r( t), t, m) = Cr( t) -1 + [ 1 - C r ( t ) - l ] e x p (  - Tr(  t)z), 
while the equilibrium price of a default-free tax-exempt municipal bond 
becomes 
Buu ( r(t), t, m) = C(( 1 - i)r(0) -1 + [ 1 - C(( 1 - Or(t)) -1] exp ( - Tr(0z) .  
However, these are precisely the equilibrium prices of a default-free corporate 
bond and a default-free municipal bond derived by Shiller and Modigliani 
(1979). This intuitively follows since Shiller and Modigliani (1979) assume a 
fiat and non-stochastic expectation of future nominal spot rates. 
We have explicitly characterized equilibrium corporate and municipal 
bond prices by specializing nominal spot rate dynamics and the market price 
of risk. Within this particular framework, we now proceed to investigate tax 
induced biases in the yield curve. We employ U.S. Treasury bill data over the 
period 1959.1 to 1978.IV to specify empirically the trend-adjusted Ornstein- 
Uhlenbeck nominal spot rate process and the prevailing market  price of risk. 
Consequently, equilibrium coupon bond prices may be simulated and the tax 
induced biases in the resultant yield curves become evident. Further insight 
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into the consequences of differential taxation upon the tax and coupon 
structure of interest rates is also provided. 
Given that interest rate data are available only at discrete points in time, 
the discrete-time version of the trend-adjusted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is 
estimated, 
Ar( t) = k( l~-  r( t - -  1)) + e( t), 
or equivalently, 
r(t) = kp +(1 - k ) r ( t -  1)+ e(t), 
t=  1,2, . . . ,M, 
t=  1,2, . . . ,M, 
where M denotes the number of observations with 
Ee(t) =0, all t, 
2 all t, Ee2(t) = a , ,  
Ee(s)e(t) = 0, all s ~ t. 
Employing quarterly observations of the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate 
over the period 1959.I to 1978.IV and ordinary least squares, the results in 
table 1 were obtained. 
Table 1 
k/~ 1 - k s h /~2 
0.00413 0.926 0.00657 0.8357 0.8265 
(0.0024) (0.038) 
An estimate of the long-term mean interest rate level is ~=0.0558, and the 
estimated speed of adjustment factor is ~= 0.074. The Durbin (1970) h statistic 
indicates no evidence against the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation at the 
5 percent significance level. An estimate of the standard deviation of the trend- 
adjusted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is provided by s = 6, =0.00657. 
The market price of risk gives the additional expected bond rate of return 
commensurate with bearing an additional unit of risk as measured by the 
standard deviation of the bond rate of return. In equilibrium, the market 
price of risk is independent of term to maturity. Accordingly, quarterly 
observations of three-month and six-month U.S. Treasury bill rates over the 
period 1960.1 to 1978.IV were employed to construct a time series measuring 
the excess three-month holding period return to six-month U.S. Treasury 
bills. An estimate of the market price of risk is given by the ratio of the mean 
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of the constructed series to its standard deviation. The former provides a 
measure of the expected excess rate of return to six-month U.S. Treasury 
bills while the latter provides a measure of the risk of that rate of return. The 
mean is estimated to be 0.005, with an estimated variance of 0.64 × 10-4; as a 
result we have ~, = -0.625. 
This estimate of the market price of risk is broadly consistent with 
Brennan and Schwartz's (1982) recent estimates employing U.S. data. To 
complete our specification, we note that as of the last week of 1978.IV, r(t)= 
0.09498. We now turn to our simulation results which further examine the 
impact of coupon, tax, and term to maturity upon equilibrium yields, given 
this particular empirical characterization of the economy's underlying 
equilibrium. 
In fig. 1 we present simulated equilibrium yield curves assuming a constant 
coupon level of C=0.04, an ordinary income tax rate of i=0.40, and a 
capital gains tax rate of g=0.16. In comparison with the resultant equili- 
brium yield curve derived in the absence of taxation, tax induced biases in 
equilibrium corporate and municipal yield curves become apparent. For this 
particular specification of prevailing tax rates and coupon level, the taxation 
of corporate issues exerts a downward bias on the corporate yield curve, the 
bias diminishing with increasing term to maturity. This result follows since 
with increasing term to maturity, a discounted corporate bond's capital gains 
taxable rate of appreciation diminishes and so its tax advantage diminishes. 
The taxation of municipal issues for this particular specification of prevailing 
tax rates and coupon level is seen to impart a uniform downward bias on the 
municipal yield curve. Coupons on municipal bonds are exempt from 
ordinary income taxation and the observed bias is explained by noting that 
this tax advantage is independent of term to maturity. 
We further investigate these tax effects given our empirical characterization 
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porate and municipal yield curves assuming a constant coupon of C = 0.04 
but now corresponding to both varying capital gains and ordinary income 
tax rates are exhibited. We assume g = 0.4i and by increasing i it follows that 
g increases and T = ( 1 -  0 ( 1 - g ) - t  necessarily decreases. 17 Lower values of T 
then index higher prevailing capital gains and ordinary income tax rates. As 
capital gains and ordinary income tax rates increase, the previously docu- 
mented bias in the short-term end of the corporate yield curve is increased. 
With higher prevailing tax rates and a constant coupon level, the tax 
advantage of short-term discounted corporate bonds is further enhanced. By 
contrast, the municipal yield curve is displaced further downward with 
increased capital gains and ordinary income taxation. Since coupons on 
17Now T = ( 1  - i ) (1  - -0 .40-  ~ and dT/di=(T- 1) (1 -0 .40 -  ~ <0. 
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municipal bonds are not taxable, by increasing prevailing tax rates the tax 
advantage of municipal bonds increases independent of term to maturity. 
Finally, fig. 3 examines how these tax induced biases in the yield curve 
vary with coupon level: recall, equilibrium yields are not independent of 
coupon level. As before, we assume an ordinary income tax rate of i=  0.40 
and a capital gains tax rate of g=0.16, but now present equilibrium corporate 
and municipal yield curves corresponding to coupon levels of C=0.01, 
0.02, 0.03, and 0.04. Given the prevailing capital gains and ordinary income 
tax rates, changes in coupon level have an indiscernable effect upon corporate 
yields. However, a systematic municipal coupon effect is evident. Lowering 
the coupon level imparts an upward bias in the municipal yield curve, 
and this bias diminishes with increasing term to maturity. To explain the 
systematic bias, we note that realized appreciation is the only taxable com- 
ponent of a discounted municipal bond's return. Lowering the coupon level 
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deepens the municipal bond's discount from par, consequently increasing 
the capital gains taxable rate of appreciation. Equilibrium municipal yields 
then increase with lower coupon levels to offset this tax disadvantage. Since 
the rate of appreciation diminishes with increasing term to maturity, it follows 
that a discounted municipal bond's capital gains tax liability diminishes with 
increasing term to maturity. 
Our simulation results have explored the impact of differential taxation 
upon the equilibrium yield curve. For the parameter values assumed, this 
analysis indicates that taxation substantially yet systematically affects both 
equilibrium municipal and corporate yield curves. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has explored the impact of differential taxation upon the 
equilibrium structure of interest rates. The analysis was conducted at three 
levels of generality. Assuming that the underlying state variables were 
generated by a multidimensional non-standardized Wiener process, equilib- 
rium coupon bond valuation relationships given differential taxation were 
established. In particular, we considered the differential taxation of realized 
appreciation and coupon income, and the differential taxation of corporate 
and municipal coupon income. In order to investigate the impact of both 
varying tax rates and varying coupon levels upon equilibrium corporate and 
municipal yields, the analysis was subsequently simplified by positing a single 
state variable, the nominal spot rate of interest. We then characterized the 
capital gains and ordinary income tax structure of interest rates for 
corporate and municipal issues, and examined both corporate and municipal 
coupon effects. Finally, the analysis was specialized by assuming a specific 
nominal spot rate process, the trend-adjusted Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, 
with particular parameters estimated on the basis of U.S. Treasury bill data. 
The resultant simulation studies allowed us to indicate tax induced biases in 
equilibrium corporate and municipal yield curves. 
Our analysis is distinct from earlier research in that bond market 
uncertainty is explicitly incorporated into equilibrium bond valuation rel- 
ationships. Formal cognizance is given to the fact that the imposition of 
taxation reduces not only the expected return to an uncertain investment but 
also the corresponding risk. We provide then a parsimonious framework to 
evaluate the effects of taxation policy changes upon the equilibrium structure 
of interest rates. 
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